Apple's Third-Generation Foundation Models & PCC on Google Cloud — AI-User Edition
Unofficial, educational explainer. Not an Apple / Google / NVIDIA publication; not affiliated. "Apple," "Private Cloud Compute," "Apple Intelligence," "Gemini," "Google," "NVIDIA" are trademarks of their owners, used for reference only.
Cites official sources only (Apple; plus partner officials Google / NVIDIA, attributed). Each fact carries
[S0X]. Benchmarks are an official beta snapshot, to be updated by the summer technical report. Baseline date: 2026-06-23.
Intro
If you use ChatGPT, Claude, or Gemini, here's what Apple shipped in June 2026: the third generation of Apple Foundation Models — a family of five models, custom-built with Google, spanning your device and a privacy cloud called Private Cloud Compute (PCC) [S01].
We follow three lines: what it is (five models) → how it works → what it means for you, then a "where does my data go / what can I trust" checklist.
1. What it is (five models)
1.1 What each model does
Think of five specialized helpers [S01]:
- AFM 3 Core — the everyday on-device base model [S01].
- AFM 3 Core Advanced — the strongest on-device model: sees images, speaks, dictates more accurately, and is frugal — activating only a small slice of itself at a time [S01].
- AFM 3 Cloud — the cloud workhorse, fast and efficient [S01].
- ADM 3 Cloud (Image) — the cloud "artist" for generating and editing images and Image Playground [S01].
- AFM 3 Cloud Pro — the strongest, for the hardest tasks like calling tools and complex reasoning [S01].
| Model | Where | What |
|---|---|---|
| AFM 3 Core | your device | everyday base |
| AFM 3 Core Advanced | your device | strongest on-device; vision, voice, dictation |
| AFM 3 Cloud | secure cloud (PCC) | cloud workhorse |
| ADM 3 Cloud | secure cloud (PCC) | image generation/editing |
| AFM 3 Cloud Pro | Google Cloud (still PCC) | strongest; hardest tasks |
Source: KB-001–007 [S01]. The first four are for Apple silicon; only Cloud Pro runs on NVIDIA GPUs in Google Cloud [S01].
1.2 On-device vs. cloud, and what PCC is
Simple requests run on your device; heavier ones go to the cloud. Apple's cloud is PCC, whose key promise is: your data is never stored or shared with anyone, including Apple [S01]. Why not keep everything on the phone? Traditionally a model's weights must stay in memory the whole time — too big for a phone — hence the device + cloud split [S01].
1.3 The Google / Gemini collaboration, in Apple's words
This is the most misread point, so here's the official wording only:
- The five models are "custom-built in collaboration with Google" [S01].
- The developer note: "custom-built in collaboration with Google and its Gemini models" [S05].
- Security: Apple collaborated with Google to "leverage the technologies behind its Gemini family of models" [S02].
The boundary: Apple does not disclose the form, proportion, or terms of Gemini's involvement [S01][S02][S05]. So this is not "running Gemini on your phone," and the press's dollar/parameter figures are not official.
Common misconceptions, cleared up:
- "Am I really using Gemini?" — The wording is "built with Google" / "leverage the technologies behind Gemini"
[S01][S02]; the models carry Apple's names (AFM 3 / ADM 3) and run on Apple-controlled device and PCC [S01]. It borrowed technology to build its own.- "Is my data sent to train Gemini?" — No: training does not use your private data or interactions [S01] (§2.6).
In short: "built with Google" is about how the models were made; "where your data goes / who can see it" is a separate question, answered by PCC's mechanisms (Part 2).
2. How it works (concepts)
2.1 How the models get stronger
- On device: the strongest on-device model keeps the whole model in storage and pulls in only the parts it needs, instead of occupying memory [S01]; it picks the "experts" each prompt needs [S01] — big yet frugal.
- In the cloud: the cloud workhorse upgrades last year's architecture for better reasoning and recall over long context [S01]; the developer-accessible cloud model has a 32,000-token context window and reasoning [S08].
2.2 How good is it (key figures, beta snapshot)
Official beta snapshot, to be updated this summer.
- On-device general text preferred 45.6% (prior baseline 23.3%) [S01] (beta snapshot).
- Cloud general text preferred 64.7% (prior 8.7%) [S01] (beta snapshot); overall satisfaction up ~36% [S01] (beta snapshot).
- Cloud Pro improves further over the cloud model (text satisfaction ~+10%, Math ~+14%) [S01] (beta snapshot).
- Dictation and voice quality also improved over the prior generation (beta snapshot) [S01].
2.3 The image model
The cloud "artist," ADM 3 Cloud, emphasizes control and efficiency and adapts to different ratios/resolutions [S01]; it natively generates and edits images and Genmoji and uses small specialized modules for features like Photos' reframing [S01]. The images are photorealistic [S01].
2.4 Where does my data go? PCC on Google Cloud
The headline: PCC extended beyond Apple's own data centers for the first time — with Google and NVIDIA, Apple runs the heaviest Apple Intelligence tasks on Google Cloud while maintaining its privacy protections [S02]. The hardest tasks (e.g., letting AI call tools, complex reasoning) go to PCC extended to Google Cloud on NVIDIA GPUs [S02]; this is the first time the industry's confidential-computing pieces were combined into one end-to-end private pipeline at global scale [S02]. The hardware includes NVIDIA's confidential-computing GPUs (NVIDIA: Blackwell GPUs support this server-side inference) [S02][S14], Intel CPUs, and Google's own Titan security chip [S02].
A way to picture the flow: simple things finish on your device and never leave it; harder things are sent encrypted to PCC. Even when that's a server in a Google data center, Apple says it keeps the same privacy guarantees as its own PCC [S01][S02]. "Different location" ≠ "weaker protection": what matters is who signs the software and whether it can be verified (next).
2.5 Why "someone else's data center" can still be safe
Apple says the five core requirements are unchanged [S02] — data discarded after use, enforced technically, no one can peek at runtime, no targeting a specific person, and everything publicly verifiable [S-PCC1]. The mechanisms (in concept):
- To prevent supply-chain tampering, all hardware is logged in an "append-only, verifiable" ledger [S02].
- Parts that could leak data require two roots of trust from independent vendors [S02].
- Full protection ramps up during the summer preview [S02].
- All software is public for inspection and open to research [S02], continuing PCC's "publicly logged, externally verifiable" approach since 2024 [S-PCC1].
- Erased after use — since 2024, PCC enforces "discard after use" by randomizing the data volume's keys on every boot so prior data can't be read again (Ephemeral Data Mode) [S-PCC2].
- Holds up even under attack — Apple's design goal is that the five requirements are never violated even if attacked, with defense-in-depth across accidental disclosure, external compromise, and physical/internal access [S-PCC2].
Partner officials (attributed): Google Cloud says it built a platform meeting Apple's PCC goals, centered on its confidential computing and Titanium/Titan architecture, and co-engineered an open-source host stack to aid external verification [S13]; NVIDIA says its Blackwell confidential-computing GPUs support this server-side inference, and that "no one, not even the system's builders, can look at your data, chats or conversations" [S14].
A metaphor: PCC is like a vault room. There's now also one built inside Google's building — but the keys, rules, and monitoring are still Apple's; the landlord (Google) only provides the space and can't open your vault, because your device only trusts software Apple signed [S02].
2.6 How it was trained
- Not trained on your data: training uses public, licensed/purchased, open-source, dedicated-study, and synthetic data; it does not use users' private data or interactions, and respects web-publisher opt-outs [S01].
- A common foundation first, then specialization into voice, vision, long-context reasoning, and image generation; then supervised fine-tuning and multi-stage reinforcement learning [S01].
- Quantization Aware Training shrinks models while keeping accuracy [S01].
3. What it means for you (privacy, capability, access)
3.1 Done responsibly
Four principles: empower users, represent users, design with care, protect privacy [S01]. In practice: a sensitive-content taxonomy, multilingual safety alignment, language-specific guardrail models, and native-speaker human red teaming across supported locales [S01] — so safety isn't English-only.
3.2 AI-generated/edited images are marked: SynthID (attributed: Google)
Any image generated or edited with Apple Intelligence automatically gets a hidden watermark, SynthID, marking it as AI-touched [S04]. SynthID is Google DeepMind's AI content watermarking and identification technology [S04][S18]. Image Playground creations carry it too [S04].
This matters for spotting AI imagery: a compatible tool can detect SynthID, signaling "AI was involved" [S04]. Note it's an invisible mark, not a visible watermark [S04].
Daily limits: image generation and other server-heavy features have daily caps; most iCloud+ plans raise them [S03].
3.3 New features (overview)
- A new Siri — understands your context, finds things across messages/emails/photos, completes tasks across apps, answers about your screen; a dedicated app privately syncs history via iCloud
[S03][S06]. - Photos — reframe composition after the shot, extend, clean up; AI-edited images carry SynthID
[S03][S04]. - Smarter Safari, Messages, Mail, and Image Playground
[S03][S04].
3.4 The developer layer (briefly)
Even if you don't code: developers can use one API to reach Claude, Gemini, or others [S05]; eligible small developers can even use PCC models at no cloud cost [S05]. For you, that means more apps with built-in AI whose on-device or PCC parts share the same privacy boundary (Part 2).
3.5 Can I use it, and where?
- Timing: developer testing today, public beta next month, free update this fall [S03].
- Languages (16): including Traditional Chinese, Simplified Chinese, Japanese, Korean, English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Turkish, Vietnamese [S03].
- Devices: newer iPhone/iPad/Mac, Apple Vision Pro, newer Apple Watch (paired with an Apple Intelligence-enabled iPhone), etc. [S03].
- New Siri: an English beta later this year, expanding to more languages [S03].
- Regions: in the EU, Siri AI isn't initially on iPhone/iPad/Watch (the DMA), though Mac and Vision Pro can
[S03][S07]; in China it waits on regulatory work [S03].
3.6 Wrap-up
Some things are undisclosed (exact parameter counts, internal structure) — we don't guess [S01]. Apple has pre-announced a summer technical report updating the figures [S01], so the beta numbers here will be revised. And PCC isn't new in 2026 — it extended device-grade privacy to the cloud back in 2024 [S-PCC1], with "data discarded after use" as a core idea [S-PCC1].
★ Checklist: where does my data go / what can I trust
Self-check against the official statements (references in brackets):
- On-device requests stay on device — simple requests run locally [S01].
- Cloud requests use PCC, not stored or shared (incl. Apple) — [S01]; discarded after use [S-PCC1].
- Five core requirements — discard-after-use, technically enforced, no peeking, not targetable, verifiable [S02] (definitions [S-PCC1]).
- Supply chain: append-only ledger [S02].
- Two independent roots of trust [S02].
- Apple still controls the software — devices trust only Apple-approved software [S02].
- Not trained on my data [S01].
- Publicly verifiable — software public, research open [S02]; continuing 2024's public logging and research environment [S-PCC1].
- Apple pays big bounties for outside scrutiny — PCC bounties go up to US$1,000,000 (remote arbitrary code execution) [S-PCC1], a signal of "enforced by technology, open to scrutiny."
Accuracy note: what's independently verifiable is "your device connects only to nodes whose software is publicly logged." Apple does not provide reproducible builds; published source is an analysis aid only [S-PCC2]. So rigorously it's "Apple states + verifiable connection to logged software," not a "bit-for-bit source comparison."
For full technical detail (IFP, PT-MoE, confidential-computing stack, attestation/ledger) see the Developer Edition; for the lightest illustrated FAQ, see the General Edition.